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This study estimates the premia demanded by investors for corporate governance risk in the 
Kenyan equity market. Using the OECD/G20 corporate governance principles, corporate 
governance indices are constructed for the 10 of the NSE 20 Share index constituents for the 
period 2008 to 2015. The indices use objectively observable principles that cover shareholder 
and stakeholder rights, disclosure and transparency as well as board responsibilities. The 
arbitrage asset pricing framework is then applied to determine the risk premia associated with 
corporate governance risk. The findings show that for the period under consideration, 
corporate governance risk attracted a premium of approximately between 4.64% and 15.16% 
in the NSE. The risk premia suggest Disclosure and Transparency standards rank above other 
elements of corporate governance in order of importance to investors in Kenya’s equity 
market. 
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1.1. Background to the study 
Corporate Governance is defined as the “system by which companies are directed and 
controlled” Cadbury (1992). The failure of companies to implement high standards of 
corporate governance has led to various financial crises globally including the Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997 and the Global Recession of 2008. It has also led to the collapse of 
various global behemoths such as Enron and the Lehman Brothers.  
In response to these crises and collapses various governments and professional bodies 
commissioned the development of corporate principles of good governance that would 
prevent future corporate failures related to governance. In the UK, corporate scandals such as 
Polly Peck and Maxwell that arose as a result of financial reporting irregularities led to the 
establishment of the ‘Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance Committee’ which 
produced the Cadbury Report (1992). The Cadbury Report made recommendation in the 
areas of disclosure & transparency, board composition and selection as well as the separation 
of the role of an organisation’s chief executive and chairman. The report’s recommendations 
were incorporated into the Listing Rules of the London Stock Exchange. 
More committees and reports were produced after the Cadbury Report (1992), such as the 
Greenbury Report (1995) which recommended recommended extensive disclosure in annual 
reports on remuneration and recommended the establishment of a remuneration committee 
comprised of non-executive directors. These recommendations were also endorsed in the 
Listing Rules of the London Stock Exchange. Other reports that followed included the 
Hampel Report (1997) which reviewed the extent to which the Cadbury and Greenbury 
reports had been implemented. The end result was the Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance which was incorporated into the Listing Rules of the London Stock Exchange. 
The code has been reviewed and iterated by various committees to date. 
In the US, the Enron scandal caused the collapse of the Enron Corporation
1
 and the 
dissolution of Arthur Andersen, one of the 5 largest audit firms in the world. The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act was introduced in 2002 in response to the Enron scandal. The act introduced 
                                                          
1
 The Enron Bankruptcy was the largest bankruptcy reorganisation in America at the time.  
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regulations to expand the reliability of financial reporting for public companies and increase 
the accountability of auditing firms to remain objective and independent of their clients.    
Global financial crises have also led to the development of various codes of corporate 
governance. The Asian financial crisis led to the development of the Code of best Practices 
for Corporate Governance while the Global Financial crisis
2
 led to the development of laws 
such as the Dodd Frank Act and Basel III. Recent corporate governance standards have 
focused on disclosure, transparency and internal risk management as a form of corporate 
governance standard especially for banks and other financial institutions. The scandals and 
financial crises that preceded these codes and laws highlight the significance of corporate 
governance risk, especially in increasingly integrated financial markets (Quinn & Voth, 
2008). 
Corporate governance risk is defined as the risk of loss emanating from inadequate principles, 
standards and practices that guide the management of companies. These principles, standards 
and practices are crucial in ensuring other risks such as financial risks do not materialise. The 
Cadbury Report (1992) points out that the existence of certain codes and practices of good 
governance in corporations is crucial in identifying malfeasance and fraudulent activities by 
the insiders of corporations before they threaten the stability of those corporations and the 
financial system. 
The question then is; what really is the value of corporate governance to investors? And if 
investors indeed value good corporate governance, is governance risk included in stock 
prices? An analysis of agency theory points out that the adoption of good corporate 
governance is crucial to the minimisation of the principal-agent conflict (Jensen & Meckling , 
1976). This in turn reduces agency costs and boosts returns due to shareholders. However, 
literature has gone further to show that the advantage not only lies in the reduction of agency 
costs but also, corporate governance can be an important factor to consider when formulating 
investment strategies. Numerous studies have shown that portfolios that buy firms with good 
corporate governance and sell those with ‘bad’ corporate governance earn superior abnormal 
returns over time ((Black, 2001), (Cremers & Vinay, 2005), (Gompers , Ishii, & Metrick, 
2003) and (Schillhofer, Drobetz, & Zimmermann, 2004) to name a few). While crucial in 
answering the first question, literature is silent on the significance of corporate governance to 
                                                          
2
 The Global Financial Crisis is estimated to have caused losses of USD 4.1 trillion by the IMF while other 
estimates put losses at over USD 15 trillion globally. 
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equity risk premia. The aim of this study is to establish whether governance risk is priced in 
capital markets using the case of Kenya. 
  
1.2. Motivation for the study 
Studies on corporate governance have focused on its impact on company valuation and stock 
performance. Most of the work has been done on developed markets but emerging and 
frontier markets have also been studied. However, the literature is silent on the risk premium 
attached to corporate governance. The equity risk premium of a company determines the cost 
at which capital markets lend money to the firm as well as the valuation of the firm. This 
information is therefore crucial not only to investors but also the company management in 
capital budgeting and capital structure decisions.  
Equity risk premiums are a central component of every risk and return model from the 
CAPM to the Fama-French factor models. However, none of these models make use of 
corporate governance as a determinant of risk. This is despite the overwhelming evidence on 
the significance of corporate governance to stock returns. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) 
(GIM) find that a trading strategy that sold stocks of firms with poor corporate governance 
and bought those with good corporate governance standards earned an abnormal return of 8% 
in the United States between 1990 and 1999. These findings are corroborated by Cremers & 
Vinay (2005) who find that the abnormal return on such a trading strategy yields an even 
larger abnormal return of up to 15%.  
It is on the auspices of these studies that this study seeks to determine what proportion of the 
equity risk premium is attributable to corporate governance. The study adds to the body of 
knowledge on equity risk premiums and quantifies the impact of corporate governance to 
capital structure and budgeting decisions as well as investment strategies.  
 
1.3. Statement of the problem 
Empirical work on corporate governance has described the positive relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance and valuation. Black, Jang, & Kim (2003) study 
the South Korean market and find that a moderate 10 point increase in a company’s corporate 
governance score predicts a 5% increase in Tobin’s q and a 14% increase in its market/book 
ratio. A worst-to-best change in the score predicts a 38% increase in Tobin's q and a 105% 
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increase in market/book ratio. Durnev & Kim (2005) further show that the positive 
relationship between corporate governance and stock returns is even stronger in countries 
whose legal systems are less investor friendly demonstrating that firms adapt to poor legal 
environments to establish efficient governance practices. The study also finds that firms with 
more investment opportunities and higher needs for financing are more likely to adopt high 
corporate governance standards.  
In Kenya, Mwangi and Mwiti (2015) find that voluntary disclosure beyond the legal 
requirements is positively related to the performance of firms listed on the NSE. Lishenga 
and Mbaka (2015) find that there is a positive effect on firm performance even when 
companies comply with the legally required standards. In a study that focuses on the entire 
East African region, Okiro, Omoro , & Aduda (2015) find a significant positive relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance as well as a positive significant 
intervening effect of leverage on the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance. 
However, few studies have attempted to determine the equity risk premium associated with 
corporate governance risk. The estimation of this relationship, the governance risk premium, 
adds not only to the body of knowledge on corporate governance but also the composition of 
equity risk premiums. This has both policy and investment implications. Bertinetti and 
Mantovani (2014) find a 142 basis point governance risk premium for the Italian equity 
market after applying a state preference theorem approach to the determination of risk 
premiums. This paper seeks to expand the body of knowledge on the governance risk 
premium with a focus on the Kenyan equity market, a frontier market. 
1.4. Research objective 
The objective of this study is; 
i. To determine the corporate governance risk premium in Kenyan capital markets. 
1.5. Research Hypothesis 
: Governance risk does not attract a premium in Kenyan Equity markets 




1.6. Justification of the Study 
An increasing number of corporate failures in the global and local stage have brought the 
importance of corporate governance to the foreground. Empirical research has shown that 
corporate governance is crucial for investors both in trading strategies as well as minimizing 
agency costs. However, corporate governance is also essential for the managers. Managers 
also have a market for their services and their track record bears on their value.  
Minimizing governance risk will contribute to higher valuations for companies and thus 
enhance value addition to the shareholders. This builds up the credibility of management. In 
addition, the consideration of governance risk is beneficial in choosing investments for retail 



















2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. The modern corporation: ownership, control and shareholder rights 
Before the industrial revolution, property was owned by the sovereign and held in trust by 
feudal lords. However, after the industrial revolution and the rise of capitalism, people owned 
property and the means of production directly. With the limited liability company, individuals 
were able to conduct business while at the same time limiting their personal liability.  
In their seminal work, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle and Means 
(1932), state that the modern corporation, an evolutionary product of the limited liability 
company, is made prolific by the expansion of industrial activity and the public market for 
securities. Berle and Means (1932), distinguish the modern corporation from the foregoing 
limited liability company. The public markets for securities enable the diverse ownership of 
companies which differs from the previous practice of individual ownership of companies. 
This diverse ownership when combined with the growth in scale of industry necessitates the 
employment of people, called management, that oversee business activities of the corporation 
in exchange for compensation.  
This in effect leads to the separation of control and ownership. Shareholders surrender the 
control they had over direct management of the company’s property to the management who 
are charged with the responsibility of executing business activity in the interest of 
shareholders. However, management does not have ownership of the company property 
which presents opportunity for the divergence of management’s interests and those of 
shareholders. Berle and Means (1932) find that in cases where ownership is sufficiently 
diverse such that no one shareholder has minority interest, the interests of shareholders can be 
subjugated to those of management. Studies by Berle and Means established such diverse 
ownership to be the case in the United States.  
This assertion has, however, been disproved by numerous studies including those of La porta 
et al (1999) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986). In an analysis of 27 wealthy economies, La porta 
et al (1999) find that with the exception of economies with high levels of shareholder 
protection such as the United States and the United Kingdom, few companies are widely 
held. Instead, concentrated ownership is held by the state or wealthy families. La porta et al 
(1999) find that equity control by financial firms is less common which directly contradicts 
findings by Schillhofer, Drobetz, & Zimmermann (2004) who find that concentrated 
ownership in Germany is exercised by banks. The two studies, however, concur that 
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concentrated ownership and the control that comes with it is executed through participation in 
management and the use of pyramids
3
.  
The evidence presented by La porta et al (1999), then begs the question of whether indeed 
shareholder interests are left at the behest of management as is proposed by Berle and Means 
(1932). The answer to this question can be found in the work presented by GIM (2003) and 
Fama (1980). GIM (2003) find and classify corporations as either democracies or 
dictatorships depending on the level of shareholder rights restriction. GIM assert that before 
the rise of the junk bond market in the 1980s and subsequent shareholder activism, 
companies were largely in the middle ground. However, the junk bond market and the hostile 
takeovers it brought with it caused management in many companies to institute takeover 
defences that largely curtailed shareholder rights. The restriction in shareholder rights had a 
significant impact on the performance of these companies and the returns due to their stocks 
as shall be seen later on in this literature review.  
Fama (1980) addresses this question in a different way. Following the work established by 
Jensen & Meckling (1976), he further establishes the description of the firm as a set of 
contracts. He points out the irrelevance of the concept of ownership of the firm by pointing 
out that in a firm each factor is owned by somebody that isn’t always the entrepreneur as is 
described by Jensen at al (1976). The entrepreneur, in this case the shareholder owns the 
firm’s capital goods which is different from ownership of the firm. Furthermore, the 
shareholder does not necessarily lose the most should management misappropriate his wealth. 
This is because of the presence of public markets for the company’s securities. Following 
from Portfolio Theory, the shareholder will have already diversified their holdings and 
reduced their exposure to misappropriation by management. Furthermore, management also 
has a market for their skills. As such poor performance of the company is reflected as 
inadequacy of their skills. This in conjunction with the fact that lower managers also aim to 
rise higher keep management in check. Additionally, the presence of non-executive directors 
in the board ensures third party supervision on management. 
While on the face of it the proposition by Fama (1980) seems to address the concerns of 
agency theory, it assumes an efficient market, both for the firm’s securities as well as the 
factors. Without an efficient market, the argument crumbles. This is where corporate 
governance comes in.  
                                                          
3
 Pyramids here refer to an ownership structure where control in one firm is maintained through the use of a 
chain of companies. 
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2.2. Corporate governance in the late 20th and 21st centuries 
Modern corporate governance started with the Cadbury report (1992). The report followed a 
series of high profile fraud and false financial reporting scandals. It sought to protect weak 
and widely dispersed shareholders against the actions of self-interested directors and 
managers. The report developed a “Code of Best Practice”. The code required voluntary 
adoption for non-listed companies and statements of compliance from listed companies. As 
such, it was not a statutory requirement and required the push of shareholders. According to 
the report, there are three main entities that are charged with the responsibility of corporate 
governance; the board of directors, shareholders and the auditors.  
Corporate Governance differs in its application in different jurisdictions. Two paradigms 
present themselves, diverse ownership vs. concentrated ownership as depicted by GIM 
(2003). From this we can derive three dominant models of corporate governance prevalent 
throughout the world; the Anglo-saxon model used in the USA and UK, the Continental 
model used in mainland Europe and the Japanese model – the Keiretsu (Schillhofer, Drobetz, 
& Zimmermann, 2004). The Anglo-saxon model is used where there is largely diverse 
ownership of companies and is thus characterised by the use of shareholder activism and 
external mechanisms of control such as takeovers to keep management in check. The 
continental model used in mainland Europe consists of concentrated ownership through 
banks and other financial institutions. Corporate control is thus channelled through the use of 
board membership and selection into the board. In the Japanese model ownership is held by 
through pyramids of corporations that form a sort of solidarity movement. Similar to the 
continental model, corporate control is channelled through the board. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the model used for corporate governance is that described by La porta 
et al (1999) where many companies are either owned by the State, wealthy families or 
pyramidal ownership structures. 
 
2.3. Corporate governance and company valuation and performance 
There is a wide body of literature on the relationship between Corporate Governance and the 
performance of companies as well as their valuation. To develop this relationship requires 
some form of measurement of corporate governance as well as a tool that shows the 
relationship between the two aspects of corporations. Many studies use a long run event study 
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methodology with regression analysis (GIM (2003), Cremers & Vinay (2005) and Schillhofer 
et al (2004)).  
In a long horizon event study regression, a corporate governance index is used. The corporate 
governance index can be constructed using the various aspects that comprise good corporate 
governance. GIM (2003) construct their index using the incidence of 24 governance rules that 
proxy for the level of shareholder rights at about 1500 large firms in the United States during 
the 1990s. Each firm receives a rating of between 1 and 24 where the absence of any rule 
leads to the subtraction of one point. The firms are then divided into ten deciles where the 
lower deciles indicate stronger shareholder rights and higher deciles weak shareholder rights. 
The study’s analysis finds that an investment strategy that sold the high decile firms and 
bought low decile firms would have earned an 8.5% abnormal return between 1990 and 1999. 
Cremers & Vinay (2005) follow closely the work done by GIM but instead focus on takeover 
defences taken up by companies.  
Their corporate governance index is therefore constructed using the incidence of said 
defences whether voluntary or through state mandate in the Unites States. Their long run 
regression event study shows that a portfolio that an investment strategy that buys firms with 
the highest level of takeover vulnerability and sells firms with the lowest level of stakeholder 
vulnerability would earn a 10 to 15% abnormal return between 1990 and 2001 only when 
there is high pension fund block shareholding. This emphasises the importance of shareholder 
activism in the monitoring of management activity. The result also shows that the internal 
and external mechanisms of corporate control are complementary in nature. However, when 
restricted to just the internal mechanisms the same strategy yields a 8% abnormal return but 
only in the presence of high takeover vulnerability.  
These two studies above highlight the importance of shareholder rights in a company. 
Stronger shareholder rights lead to reduced agency costs since management has a stronger 
incentive to act in the best interests of the shareholders. The lower agency costs then yield 
higher performance and valuation in an efficient market (Gompers , Ishii, & Metrick, 2003). 
However, the two studies fall short because they only consider one aspect of corporate 
governance. The results of these studies then may belay the presence of effects of other 
governance metrics such as disclosure. Black (2001) finds that the effects of disclosure are 
highly correlated with the effects of the other governance metrics. 
10 
 
In Korea, Black et al (2003) use a more comprehensive approach to the construction of the 
corporate governance index. The index contains sub-indices that have proxies for shareholder 
rights, board of directors in general, outside directors, audit committee, disclosure and 
ownership parity. The use of more corporate governance metrics solves the problems 
identified above from the work done by GIM (2003) and Cremers & Vishny (2005).  
The results of the study above find that a 10 point increase in the corporate governance index 
predicts a 5% increase in Tobin’s q and a 14% increase in the market/book ratio while a 
worst-to-best change in the index predicts a 38% increase in Tobin's q and a 105% increase in 
market/book ratio. Delving into the results from the regressions on the elements of the sub-
indices shows that the elements have more predictive power when they are aggregated 
together. However, the single strongest coefficient is produced by regression on the incidence 
of ≥50% independent non-executive directors. The coefficient implies that a firm with 50% 
outside directors has a higher market capitalization by 17% of book asset value. This differs 
from results found in the United States by Bhagat & Black (1999).  
Governance indices can also be constructed by combining two or more different governance 
indices. This is the case in Black, Love, & Rachinsky (2006). The study combines four 
different governance indices to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and 
firm performance with fixed effects. The study finds an economically important and 
statistically strong correlation between governance and market value both in OLS and in 
fixed effects regressions with firm-index fixed effects. The novelty of this study is that it 
addresses the possibility that there are unobserved firm level variables that explain the 
correlation between corporate governance and firm performance and valuation. Black et al 
(2003) similarly address this problem by introducing control variables for various aspects 
such as firm age. The results show that even with these controls, most of the coefficients 
remain significant even though they may be weaker.  
Further both studies demonstrate that the way governance is measured matters by applying 





2.4. Causal Relationship between Corporate Governance and Firm 
Performance and Valuation 
Correlation between corporate governance and firm performance and valuation can be 
explained in three ways; first is that higher corporate governance standards in a firm lead to 
better firm performance and higher valuations by investors. The second is that larger market 
capitalisation companies attract higher levels of attention from market participants and thus 
are forced to adopt better corporate governance practices. This is described as endogeneity. 
The third is signalling which states that; by adopting better corporate governance principles, 
firms signal that the insiders intend to “behave well”. However, it is not the adoption and 
application of the principles that predict higher valuations but rather the signals themselves. 
Several studies have attempted to establish which of the three explains the correlation 
between firm performance and valuation and corporate governance including Bhagat & Black 
(1999), Black et al (2003) and Black, Love, & Rachinsky (2006). Other studies include 
Durnev & Kim (2005) and Weisbach & Benjamin (2001). 
To control for company size, Black et al (2003) include an asset size dummy variable. The 
expectation is that the coefficient of this variable (should it be that the index value explains 
entirely the correlation between corporate governance and firm valuation) will be 
insignificant. The results show that the asset size dummy is an exogenous predictor of 
corporate governance thus proving the possibility of reverse causation. The results further 
prove that mandatory governance rules are significant in the explanation of the correlation 
between corporate governance and firm valuation. Bhagat & Black (1999) find that there is a 
negative correlation between board independence and firm performance. However, they also 
determine that board composition is an endogenous determination of corporate governance. 
However, the negative correlation weakens and becomes statistically insignificant after 
controlling for this endogenous effect. 
 
2.5. The Risk Premium for Corporate Governance 
While there is a wide body of research on the relationship between corporate governance and 
company valuation, literature on the risk premium attached to corporate governance is slim 
and most of the work has been done on developed markets. From the literature reveiewed for 
the purpose of this study Bertinetti & Mantovani (2014) is the only study that attempts to 
determine the risk premium for corporate governance. They posit that there is indeed a risk 
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premium for corporate governance because of incomplete markets and the nexus of contracts 
elaborated by Fama (1980). Every member of the company takes out a contract with the 
company with some economic incentive (return) but with the risk that the other members 
might not fulfil their end of the contract leading to the loss of the economic incentive. They 
apply State Preference Theorem and the CAPM to price for corporate governance risk in 
different states of nature. They establish that for the Italian Stock Exchange, governance risk 
attracts a 142bp premium. 
 
2.6. Similar Studies in Kenya 
There is a wide body of research on corporate governance in Kenya. Iraya, Mwangi, & 
Muchoki (2015) investigate the effect of corporate governance practices on earnings 
management at the NSE and find that is negatively related to ownership concentration, board 
size and board independence but positively related to board activity and CEO duality. 
Mwangi & Mwiti (2015) find that voluntary disclosure is positively correlated with firm 
performance for firms listed at the NSE. The study echoes the findings of Black et al (2003) 
which show some companies outperform others within country as a result of adopting 
voluntary standards of corporate governance. Lishenga & Mbaka (2015) perform the same 
study focusing on the mandatory disclosure requirements set in the CMA Guidelines on 
Corporate Governance issued in 2002. The study finds similar results as those of Mwangi & 
Mwiti (2015). 
 
2.7. Conclusion: Relationship between Research Objectives and Literature 
Studies have shown that corporate governance has a significant effect on firm valuation and 
performance. This study extends on that literature by estimating a risk premium for corporate 
governance with the example of the Kenyan capital markets. Like Black et al (2003) a 
corporate governance index is constructed based on a wide array of corporate governance 
standards and practices with the use of secondary data. Black et al (2003) uses primary data. 
 The approach taken with regard to the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
valuation in this study is also different. While Black, Love, & Rachinsky (2006), GIM (2003) 
and Cremers & Vinay (2005) all assess this relationship by establishing a positive and 
significant correlation between corporate governance and the value of the firm, this study 
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delves into the discount factor used in valuing firms. An attempt is made to establish what 
proportion of the return is attributable to corporate governance, that is, the risk attached to 
compliance and non-compliance to global standards of corporate governance. However, there 
is similarity in the assumption of a buy and hold strategy of all subject companies. This study 
also attempts to establish the variance in risk premiums between good and bad corporate 
governance from a portfolio perspective. This is done by creating portfolios based on the 
subject companies’ corporate governance scores. 
This paper takes on the point of view of Fama (1980), Jensen at al (1976) and Bertinetti et al 
(2014) where the firm is described as a nexus of contracts. This helps explain the motivation 
to management to adopt the highest corporate governance standards. The payoff to 
management is a higher value in the market for their services. This value is derived from a 
higher valuation of their companies due to lower risk premiums demanded by investors. A 
lower risk premium also aids management in capital budgeting and capital structure 
decisions. The risk premium measurement approach, however, differs from that of Bertinetti 
et al (2014) which measures the corporate governance risk premium as an aggregation of the 
risk premium demanded by different stakeholders during different life cycle stages of the 
company. In this study, the corporate governance risk premium is measured from the point of 













3.1. Research Design 
The process used in this study involves the construction of a corporate governance index for 
the constituent companies of the NSE 20 Share Index. Each company gets a corporate 
governance score of between 0 and 21 which is then standardised. The dispersion from the 
market governance mean for each year forms the index..  
The stock return is then computed on an annual basis based on the last trading price of the 
year. The holding period return, ��, is computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the 
price at the end of year � to the price at the end of year � − 1.  
�� = ���,�−            ( 1 ) 
The risk premiums of each company are then determined by deducting the proxy risk free 
rate from the stock return calculated as above and regressed against fundamental and 
macroeconomic factors that affect stock returns to obtain corporate governance exposure. 
This exposure is then used to determine the corporate governance risk premium in an 
arbitrage pricing theory framework. 
 
3.2. Population and Sampling 
There are 10 subject companies in this study obtained from the NSE. To address the question 
of blanket applicability of corporate governance to different industries, subject companies 
represent 7 out of 12 industry classifications on the market. The stocks on the index are blue 
chip stocks which ensures they reflect market behaviour. Table 1 presents the salient features 
of these stocks. 




ARM                                              50,451,339,225.00  
Bamburi                                              44,327,112,500.00  
Investment Centum                                              40,924,669,162.50  
Banking Equity Bank                                              27,808,405,391.25  




KenGen                                                2,964,721,500.00  






KQ                                           186,990,239,510.00  
TPS Serena                                              21,258,155,279.52  
Agriculture Sasini                                           546,707,890,000.00  
  Total                                           941,101,168,114.77  
Table 1: This table presents the market capitalisation and industry classification of the stocks used in this study. 
There are 10 stocks which represent 7 out of 12 industries. The total market capitalisation of these stocks 
accounts for half the market capitalisation of the NSE as at the end of 2015. 
 
3.3. Data Types and Sources 
The study makes use of qualitative and quantitative data. Qualitative data observed from the 
financial statements of the NSE 20 Share Index companies is used to construct the corporate 
governance index. The historical prices of these stocks are used to determine their returns. 
Lastly, the return on 91-Day Treasury Bills is used as a proxy for the risk free rate which is 
used to determine the risk premiums of the stocks.  
The stock price information is collected from stock market information vendors and the 
corporate governance variables are obtained from the subject companies’ annual report. To 
ensure the adequacy of the data, this study relies on data from 2008-2015 in estimating the 
relationship between the risk premium and corporate governance score. The eight-year 
analysis gives a medium term horizon analysis of the relationship. 
 
3.4. Data Analysis 
3.4.1. Construction of the Corporate Governance Index 
The study makes use of the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2015) to extract 
23 variables that are classified into 4 sub-indices; shareholder rights, stakeholder rights, 
disclosure & transparency and board responsibilities (See Appendix A). The variables are 
standards/practices that are objectively observable from the financial statements of the NSE 
20 Share Index companies. Each variable takes on a value of 1 if present and 0 if absent 
except for CEO duality which takes on a value of -1 if present and 0 if absent.  The 
summation of the variables values yields the value of each sub-index. 
The final governance score is computed as follows; = + + +          ( 2 ) 
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Where A = Shareholder rights 
 B = Stakeholder rights 
 C = Disclosure and Transparency 
 D = Board Responsibilities 
To introduce an element of risk in the index, dispersions from the mean are computed. The 
mean used here is the governance score mean of the 10 stocks for each year. In this way, 
companies with better than average governance standards are rewarded with a positive index 
value while companies that have below average governance standards attract a negative index 
value. 
Three other indices are developed to assess the contribution of each governance sub-index to 
the corporate governance risk premium. These indices are computed by changing the 
weighting scheme such that each index is 50% biased to the total score of one sub-index. 
 
3.4.2. Model Specification and Corporate Governance Risk Premium 
determination 
The Fama and Macbeth (1973) approach is applied in an APT framework to obtain the risk 
premia for corporate governance. The approach involves two steps. The first step yields the 
factor loadings for the parameters in the model presented in equation 3 below. The 
parameters used to construct the model are corporate governance, two fundamental factors 
and two macroeconomic factors. These parameters are chosen because of their affirmation by 
previous studies to be sufficient in explaining cross-sectional variation in stock returns. Fama 
and French (1992) in their seminal study on the applicability of the CAPM find that size and 
book-to-market equity, combine to capture the cross-sectional variation in average stock 
returns associated with market size, leverage, book-to-market equity, and earnings-price 
ratios. These are represented here by size and value factors. Other studies have shown that 
GDP growth and inflation are prolific in explaining variation in stock returns. 




Where �� is the return on stock � at time �. , , ,  and  are the factor loadings that 
determine the return ��. � � �� is the governance score while � represents 
inflation and �, the GDP growth.  �� �� and � ��  represent value and size 
factors. 
The second step involves the cross-sectional regressions of the factor loadings against excess 
stock returns to obtain the risk premia due to the parameters. This is reflected in equation 5. 
However, this study deviates from the approach used by Fama and Macbeth by using a 
pooled model so as to obtain a single risk premium for the market for the entire period under 
consideration as opposed to every year in the study’s horizon.  
�� = � ��− + � � + � � + � � + � � + � � + ��    ( 4) 
 
Where �� is the excess return and  �� is the risk premium to the risk factors. �  is the risk 
premium to corporate governance while ��−  is the lagged value of the excess return on each 
stock. ��−  is added so as to enhance the explanatory power of the model and reduce 
collinearity. 
To address the possible endogeneity problem that may arise as a result of the chosen 
regressors, the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) approach is used in both the first 
step and second step Fama Macbeth regressions. The first step Fama Macbeth regressions 
apply the time series instrumental variable Generalised Method of Moments (IVGMM) 
regression to equation 3 while the second step Fama Macbeth regressions apply the Arelano-









4. RESULTS  
4.1. Corporate Governance Index 
The governance indices are presented in tables 2 to 4. Their descriptive statistics are 
displayed in Appendix B. An analysis of the indices potentially holds the answer to whether 
governance standards are applicable uniformly across various industries. The answer to this 
question could take three forms; an affirmation that governance standards are indeed 
uniformly applicable, an affirmation of blanket applicability but not a uniform level of 
importance and a negation of any form of blanket applicability. Analysis of the indices 
suggests an answer of the second variety; affirmation of blanket applicability but not a 
uniform level of importance. This is apparent from the minimal change in signs of the index 
values for the stocks across the indices but differing levels of magnitude of the dispersion 
from the mean.  
It is noteworthy that companies which have significant government shareholding (≥ 20%) 
consistently post positive index values across the indices. This would seem to buck the 
perception that it government shareholding of itself reduces the value of the governance risk 
premium since the government will bail out these companies anyway and reduce the risk of 
loss to other shareholders. The indices suggest that listing on public equity markets instead is 
what leads to the reduction in risk of loss to the shareholders due to mismanagement since it 
forces these companies to implement better governance standards. However, this conclusion 
can only be affirmed by a comparison of the scores before and after listing of which this 
paper falls short. 
 
 Equally Weighted Index        
 Sasini KQ TPS Serena Equity ARM Bamburi KPLC KenGen Centum Safaricom
2008 -8.57% 10.48% 5.71% 0.95% -13.33% 5.71% 15.24% -3.81% 5.71% -18.10%
2009 -19.05% 0.00% 9.52% 0.00% -14.29% 14.29% 9.52% -9.52% 14.29% -4.76%
2010 -17.62% 1.43% 10.95% -3.33% 1.43% 1.43% 15.71% 20.48% -31.90% 1.43%
2011 -9.52% -9.52% 4.76% 4.76% -4.76% -4.76% 14.29% 4.76% 4.76% -4.76%
2012 -4.29% -9.05% -4.29% 5.24% -4.29% -4.29% 14.76% 10.00% -4.29% 0.48%
2013 -2.86% -2.86% -2.86% 6.67% -2.86% -12.38% 11.43% 6.67% -2.86% 1.90%
2014 -9.05% -4.29% -4.29% 10.00% -4.29% -13.81% 14.76% 10.00% 0.48% 0.48%
2015 -4.29% -9.05% 5.24% 10.00% -9.05% -13.81% 10.00% 5.24% 0.48% 5.24%
Table 2 displays the equally weighted governance index where the total score from each sub-index is allotted 
33.33% of the total score of the entire score. The final value displayed here is the dispersion from the mean of 
each stock’s total score. The mean is the average total score from all the stocks. 
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 Bias on Stakeholder Rights        
 Sasini KQ TPS Serena Equity ARM Bamburi KPLC KenGen Centum Safaricom
2008 -5.06% 6.19% 3.69% 0.56% -8.19% 3.69% 9.31% -2.56% 3.69% -11.31%
2009 -12.48% -1.23% 5.02% -1.23% -10.60% 21.06% 4.40% -7.48% 7.52% -4.98%
2010 -12.96% -1.71% 4.54% -4.83% -2.33% 11.21% 7.04% 10.17% -22.33% 11.21%
2011 -8.46% -8.46% 0.29% 0.29% -5.96% 7.58% 20.08% 0.29% 0.29% -5.96%
2012 -6.94% -9.44% -6.94% -0.69% -6.94% 6.60% 19.10% 2.44% -6.94% 9.73%
2013 -5.94% -5.94% -5.94% 0.31% -5.94% 1.35% 16.98% 0.31% -5.94% 10.73%
2014 -10.79% -8.29% -8.29% 1.08% -8.29% -1.00% 17.75% 1.08% 8.38% 8.38%
2015 -6.40% -8.90% 13.40% 2.98% -42.02% 0.90% 16.52% -0.15% 10.27% 13.40%
Table 3 displays the index biased in favour of Stakeholder Rights which comprise both shareholder and other 
stakeholder rights. It differs from table 2 in that the total governance score used to calculate the dispersion from 
the mean (which constitutes the final index) is obtained by allocating a 50% weighting to the stakeholder rights 
score and 25% each to disclosure & transparency and board responsibilities. 
 
 Bias on Disclosure and Transparency       
 Sasini KQ TPS Serena Equity ARM Bamburi KPLC KenGen Centum Safaricom
2008 -7.31% 8.94% 3.94% 0.81% -10.44% 3.94% 12.06% -2.31% 3.94% -13.56%
2009 -17.15% -0.90% 5.35% -0.90% -10.27% 15.56% 7.23% -7.15% 10.35% -2.15%
2010 -16.54% -0.29% 5.96% -3.42% 1.58% 6.79% 10.96% 14.08% -25.92% 6.79%
2011 -8.79% -8.79% 2.46% 2.46% -3.79% 1.42% 13.92% 2.46% 2.46% -3.79%
2012 -4.19% -9.19% -4.19% 2.06% -4.19% 1.02% 13.52% 5.19% -4.19% 4.15%
2013 -3.44% -3.44% -3.44% 2.81% -3.44% -4.48% 11.15% 2.81% -3.44% 4.90%
2014 -9.71% -4.71% -4.71% 4.67% -4.71% -5.75% 13.00% 4.67% 3.62% 3.62%
2015 0.02% -4.98% 11.48% 9.40% -55.60% -1.02% 14.60% 6.27% 8.35% 11.48%
Table 4 displays the the index biased in favour of the Disclosure and Transparency sub-index. The total 
governance score used to compute the dispersion from the mean displayed here is computed by allotting a 50% 
weight to the Disclosure and Transparency sub-index score and 25% each to the other two sub-indices.  
 
 Bias on Board Responsibilities        
 Sasini KQ TPS Serena Equity ARM Bamburi KPLC KenGen Centum Safaricom
2008 -7.88% 9.62% 7.13% 0.88% -14.13% 7.13% 15.88% -5.38% 7.13% -20.38%
2009 -16.96% 0.54% 13.04% 0.54% -18.21% 17.63% 9.29% -11.96% 15.54% -9.46%
2010 -15.67% 1.83% 14.33% -4.42% -1.92% 0.17% 16.83% 23.08% -34.42% 0.17%
2011 -9.92% -9.92% 5.08% 5.08% -7.42% -5.33% 19.67% 5.08% 5.08% -7.42%
2012 -6.63% -9.12% -6.63% 5.88% -6.63% -4.54% 20.46% 12.13% -6.63% 1.71%
2013 -4.38% -4.38% -4.38% 8.13% -4.38% -14.79% 16.46% 8.13% -4.38% 3.96%
2014 -9.33% -6.83% -6.83% 11.92% -6.83% -17.25% 20.25% 11.92% 1.50% 1.50%
2015 -2.54% -5.04% 12.04% 16.21% -53.79% -12.96% 18.29% 9.96% 5.79% 12.04%
Table 5 displays the the index biased in favour of the Board Responsibilities sub-index. The total governance 
score used to compute the dispersion from the mean displayed here is computed by allotting a 50% weight to the 




4.2. Fama Macbeth Regressions 
4.2.1. First Pass Regressions 
The first step of the Fama Macbeth  regressions yields the coefficients presented in Table 6. 
The regression statistics are presented in Appendix C. All the coefficients and the model are 
statistically significant with the explanatory power of the model ranging between 30% and 
99.99% for different stocks and over different indices. The results indicate that overall, 
standards on board responsibilities have the most positive effect on the return of stocks with 
only 3 stocks having a negative corporate governance coefficient as compared to 5 in 
regressions with the other two biased indices. Overall, corporate governance had a positive 
impact on returns for 7 out of 10 companies in the sample. 
 
Equally Weighted Index Regression Results    
 SMB CGIScore GDPGrowth Inflation HML 
ARM -0.2012 -0.0930 0.0074 -0.0757 -0.0284 
Bamburi -0.2729 0.1073 -1.1998 -0.2113 -0.1473 
Centum -0.0434 0.0227 0.0961 -0.1063 -0.0127 
Equity 0.0304 -0.0183 -0.0889 -0.0449 -0.0112 
Safaricom -0.0582 0.0453 -0.0913 -0.0157 -0.0009 
KenGen -0.0143 -0.0183 -0.0021 -0.0607 -0.0100 
KPLC -0.0124 0.0574 -0.0050 -0.0204 0.0086 
KQ 0.7786 0.3660 -0.6219 0.2457 -0.0966 
TPS_Serena -0.2092 -0.0376 0.2871 0.0001 0.0287 
Sasini -0.0145 0.0021 0.0712 -0.0099 0.0053 
 
Index with Bias on Stakeholder Rights Regression Results 
 SMB CGIScore GDPGrowth Inflation HML 
ARM 0.5549 0.1354 0.0385 0.0288 0.0292 
Bamburi -1.2983 -0.1031 -0.1930 -0.0848 0.0083 
Centum -0.0743 0.0183 0.0384 -0.0846 -0.0111 
Equity 0.0297 -0.0402 -0.0799 -0.0386 -0.0089 
Safaricom -0.0334 0.0156 -0.0820 -0.0162 -0.0004 
KenGen -0.0271 -0.0004 -0.0272 -0.0451 -0.0022 
KPLC 0.0700 -0.0323 -0.0586 0.0092 -0.0126 
KQ -1.0476 -0.5982 0.4684 -0.3934 0.1093 
TPS_Serena -0.1341 0.0078 0.0578 -0.0234 0.0033 
Sasini 1.3028 1.4248 -1.4636 0.1516 -0.2295 
 
 
     
Index with Bias on Disclosure and Transparency Regression Results 
 SMB CGIScore GDPGrowth Inflation HML 
ARM -0.0786 0.0161 -0.0554 -0.0323 -0.0007 
Bamburi -1.1319 -0.0658 -0.2488 -0.0997 -0.0084 
Centum -0.0888 0.0285 0.0970 -0.1046 -0.0126 
Equity 0.0836 -0.0450 -0.0930 -0.0358 -0.0117 
Safaricom -0.0273 0.0181 -0.1043 -0.0275 -0.0039 
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KenGen -0.0231 -0.0038 -0.0196 -0.0464 -0.0028 
KPLC 0.0641 -0.0677 0.0066 0.0068 -0.0073 
KQ 0.6082 0.5045 -0.8204 0.2495 -0.1266 
TPS_Serena -0.1425 -0.0871 0.4820 0.0331 0.0509 
Sasini -0.0148 0.0020 0.0695 -0.0102 0.0050 
      
Index with Bias on Board Responsibilities Regression 
Results 
   
 SMB CGIScore GDPGrowth Inflation HML 
ARM -0.0754 0.0207 -0.0342 -0.0205 0.0045 
Bamburi -0.2362 0.1020 -1.3836 -0.2558 -0.1692 
Centum -0.0588 0.0203 0.0778 -0.1073 -0.0141 
Equity 0.0467 -0.0172 -0.0917 -0.0447 -0.0110 
Safaricom -0.0710 0.0229 -0.0818 -0.0233 -0.0002 
KenGen -0.0202 -0.0034 -0.0208 -0.0479 -0.0036 
KPLC -0.1534 0.0919 0.0375 -0.0543 0.0260 
KQ 1.0517 0.6219 -1.3433 0.4020 -0.2065 
TPS_Serena -0.1974 -0.0306 0.3219 0.0020 0.0335 
Sasini -0.0153 0.0025 0.0700 -0.0099 0.0051 
Table 6: The coefficients produced by the first step of the Fama Macbeth regressions using equation 3 where: 
SMB = the size factor, CGIScore = the corporate governance score, GDPGrowth = GDP and HML = the value 
factor. These coefficients are then plugged into equation 4 to obtain the risk premia for each factor in an APT 
framework. 
 
4.2.2. Second Pass Fama Macbeth Regressions 
The results of the second pass Fama Macbeth regressions are presented in tables 7 to 10.  
Premia from the Equally Weighted Index  
Applying the coefficients obtained from regressions with the equally weighted index, the 
results indicate that the market demanded a 30.08% risk premium for corporate governance. 
It defies economic theory since it is larger than all the total returns of the stocks in the study. 
However, as is explained below, the risk premia for corporate governance start to make sense 
with the biased indices and when control variables are added to the model. These results seem 
to support the conclusion implied from the indices that while corporate governance standards 
are of importance to all companies, some elements are more important to investors and 
subsequently management than others. 
The figure is statistically insignificant unlike the model which passes both the Sargan and 
Hansen tests indicating that the model is adequately identified. The model also passes the 
first autoregressive (AR(1)) test but fails the second (AR(2)). These results are puzzling since 
they seem to conflict with the assertion of a well defined model derived from the Sargan and 
Hansen tests. A possible source of this conflict could be the combination of a relatively short 
horizon in a low frequency and the assumption of a zero constant term from the APT 
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framework. While the Arrelano-Bond/Blundell GMM estimator approach addresses the first 
problem, it does not cater to the second.  
Equally Weighted Index             
Prob > chi2  0.0000       
ExcessReturn Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
L1. 0.8526 1.9215 0.4400 0.6570 -2.9135 4.6186 
CGIScore 0.3008 19.4510 0.0200 0.9880 -37.8224 38.4240 
GDPGrowth 0.0988 5.9338 0.0200 0.9870 -11.5312 11.7288 
Inflation 0.8398 24.1607 0.0300 0.9720 -46.5143 48.1939 
HML -0.9052 43.8133 -0.0200 0.9840 -86.7776 84.9673 
SMB -0.4571 17.4188 -0.0300 0.9790 -34.5973 33.6830 
         
AR(1)   Sargan test     
Pr > z 0.7550  Prob > chi2 0.9910    
AR(2)   Hansen test     
Pr > z 0.0310   Prob > chi2 0.2800     
Table 7 presents the results of the second step of the Fama Macbeth regressions using the Arellano-
Bond/Blundell GMM estimator approach with coefficients obtained from first pass regressions using the equally 
weighted governance index. L1. = the first lag of the excess return, CGIScore = the governance factor, HML = 
the value factor, GDPGrowth = the GDP factor and SMB = the size factor. While the model passes the first 
autoregressive (AR(1)) test, the Sargan and Hansen’s tests, it fails in the second autoregressive (AR(2)) test. For 
all the tests, rejection of the null hypothesis leads means the model fails  the test. 
 
Premia from the Stakeholder Rights Biased Index  
The results indicate that investors in Kenya’s equity market demanded a 4.64% risk premium 
for corporate governance between 2008 and 2915 where the focus is on Stakeholder Rights. 
This is a sharp decline compared to the 30.08% result from the equally weighted governance 
index. It is also the lowest risk premium of all the indices even when control variables are 
added to the model.  
The results suggest that stakeholder rights rank last in the importance of different governance 
elements. This is somewhat a contradiction to the results of GIM (2003) and Cremers and 
Vinay (2005) who find that in the US more shareholder rights in a company leads to better 
company performance which connotes lower governance risk. A possible answer to this 
contradiction lies in the ownership structure of companies in Kenya. While companies in the 
US are diversely owned as in the model suggested by Schillhofer et al (2004), the opposite is 
true in Kenya where ownership is concentrated in the hands of government, corporations and 
families/individuals. As such the major shareholders have a major say in the composition of 
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the board such that they have more control over the rights available to them. This is 
documented in La-Porta et al (1999). 
Stakeholder Rights Bias             
Prob > chi2  0.0000       
ExcessReturn Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
L1. -0.6223 0.4809 -1.2900 0.1960 -1.5648 0.3202 
CGIScore 0.0464 0.6121 0.0800 0.9400 -1.1532 1.2460 
GDPGrowth 0.0634 0.9715 0.0700 0.9480 -1.8408 1.9676 
Inflation 4.1038 2.0137 2.0400 0.0420 0.1569 8.0506 
HML 1.3391 5.1613 0.2600 0.7950 -8.7770 11.4551 
SMB -0.3890 0.1878 -2.0700 0.0380 -0.7570 -0.0210 
         
AR(1)   Sargan test    
Pr > z 0.8370  Prob > chi2 0.3210    
AR(2)   Hansen test    
Pr > z 0.0310   Prob > chi2 0.1980     
Table 8 presents the results of the second step of the Fama Macbeth regressions using the Arellano-
Bond/Blundell GMM estimator approach with coefficients obtained from first pass regressions using the 
corporate governance index biased towards stakeholder rights. L1. = the first lag of the excess return, CGIScore 
= the governance factor, HML = the value factor, GDPGrowth = the GDP factor and SMB = the size factor. 
While the model passes the first autoregressive (AR(1)) test, the Sargan and Hansen’s tests, it fails in the second 
autoregressive (AR(2)) test. For all the tests, rejection of the null hypothesis leads means the model fails the test. 
 
Premia from the Disclosure and Transparency standards biased Index  
When the spotlight is focussed on Disclosure and Transparency standards, the risk premium 
demanded by investors rises to 15.16% for the period under investigation. While the figure is 
statistically insignificant, its economic importance cannot be overstated. With the exception 
of the results from the equally weighted index, this is the highest recorded risk premium. The 
suggestion then is that Disclosure and Transparency are the most important elements of 
governance to investors in Kenya’s equity market.  
The results are congruent with the findings of Mwangi & Mwiti (2015) and Lishenga & 
Mbaka (2015) who find a positive relationship between governance disclosure practices and 
firm performance. Conclusions can also be drawn about the effectiveness of mandatory 
disclosure standards imposed by the CMA since 2002. While extensive, this risk premium 
suggests that they fall short of investor’s expectations which would then justify the stricter 




Bias on Disclosure and Transparency             
Prob > chi2  0.0000       
ExcessReturn Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
L1. 0.6981 0.3670 1.9000 0.0570 -0.0212 1.4175 
CGIScore 0.1516 0.2586 0.5900 0.5580 -0.3552 0.6584 
GDPGrowth -0.4971 1.0720 -0.4600 0.6430 -2.5981 1.6039 
Inflation -0.6757 1.7599 -0.3800 0.7010 -4.1250 2.7737 
HML 4.3632 8.2947 0.5300 0.5990 -11.8942 20.6206 
SMB 0.3027 0.6851 0.4400 0.6590 -1.0400 1.6455 
         
AR(1)   Sargan test    
Pr > z 0.1910  Prob > chi2 0.5940    
AR(2)   Hansen test    
Pr > z 0.0020   Prob > chi2 0.5270     
Table 9 presents the results of the second step of the Fama Macbeth regressions using the Arellano-
Bond/Blundell GMM estimator approach with coefficients obtained from first pass regressions using the 
corporate governance index biased towards Disclosure and Transparency L1. = the first lag of the excess return, 
CGIScore = the governance factor, HML = the value factor, GDPGrowth = the GDP factor and SMB = the size 
factor. While the model passes the first autoregressive (AR(1)) test, the Sargan and Hansen’s tests, it fails in the 
second autoregressive (AR(2)) test. For all the tests, rejection of the null hypothesis leads means the model fails 
the test. 
 
Premia from the Board Responsibilities standards biased Index  
Investors in Kenya’s equity market demanded a 6.04% risk premium when the focus is on 
board responsibilities. This would rank standards on board responsibilities second in 
importance to equity investors after disclosure and transparency standards. Similar to the 
other two biased indices, the results are statistically insignificant but call for a discussion on 
their economic significance.  
The results are puzzling when the board room scandals that have rocked the market in the last 
10 years are considered (for example those of CMC Motors, Uchumi and Kenya Airways). 
Logic would dictate that investors demand better standards on board responsibilities. 
However, it can be argued that since as per the prevalent mode of ownership, major 
shareholders already control the boards of listed companies, other investors resort to demands 
for higher disclosure and transparency standards as a way to safeguard their investments. This 
paints a gloomy picture of the state of corporate governance in the country; where instead of 
demanding for better leadership and stronger rights, it is easier for investors demand better 




Bias on Board Responsibilities             
Prob > chi2  0.0000       
ExcessReturn Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
L1. 0.9612 2.4018 0.4000 0.6890 -3.7463 5.6687 
CGIScore 0.0604 5.1605 0.0100 0.9910 -10.0539 10.1747 
GDPGrowth 0.6096 12.4484 0.0500 0.9610 -23.7888 25.0080 
Inflation 3.6177 60.8644 0.0600 0.9530 -115.6743 122.9096 
HML -8.0598 146.0793 -0.0600 0.9560 -294.3701 278.2504 
SMB -2.2232 38.9720 -0.0600 0.9550 -78.6068 74.1604 
         
AR(1)   Sargan test    
Pr > z 0.7850  Prob > chi2 0.6370    
AR(2)   Hansen test    
Pr > z 0.0860   Prob > chi2 0.4680     
Table 10 presents the results of the second step of the Fama Macbeth regressions using the Arellano-
Bond/Blundell GMM estimator approach with coefficients obtained from first pass regressions using the 
corporate governance index biased towards Disclosure and Transparency L1. = the first lag of the excess return, 
CGIScore = the governance factor, HML = the value factor, GDPGrowth = the GDP factor and SMB = the size 
factor. The results in this table are unlike the others since the model passes all the tests including the AR(2) test. 
For all the tests, rejection of the null hypothesis leads means the model fails the test. 
 
Premia demanded when control variables are added to the model. 
Two control variables are added to the model; government shareholding and asset turnover. 
Government shareholding is added to investigate the perception that governance standards do 
not matter when a company has significant government shareholding.  
A dummy variable is used to represent significant government shareholding (≥20%). Asset 
turnover is added as a proxy for efficiency and therefore tests the risk premium demanded by 
investors for governance standards that relate to efficiency of operations. The results are 
contained in tables 11 and 12. 
The results indicate that government shareholding in listed companies does not reduce the 
risk of loss from collapse as a result of poor governance standards. Investors demand a risk 
premium of 11.89%. However, these results are incongruent with the fact that companies in 
the sample that have significant government shareholding consistently post better than 
average governance scores.  
There are two possible explanations. It could be that privatisation of government owned 
companies opens them up to even more scrutiny which forces them to  adopt higher 
government standards. However, investors still retain the perception that government 
26 
 
companies have poor governance standards and therefore demand a high risk premium from 
these companies. Alternatively, it could be the opposite and investors perceive companies 
with significant government shareholding as having high standards of corporate governance. 
The other companies are the source of a significant portion of the risk premium. 
 
Control on Significant Government 
Shareholding 
            
Prob > chi2  0.0000       
ExcessReturn Coef. Std. 
Err. 
z P>|z| [95% 
Conf. 
Interval
L1. 0.7114 1.9019 0.3700 0.7080 -3.0162 4.4391
CGIScore 0.1189 6.9227 0.0200 0.9860 -13.4493 13.6872
GDPGrowth 0.0232 2.6414 0.0100 0.9930 -5.1538 5.2002
Inflation 0.2313 14.9180 0.0200 0.9880 -29.0074 29.4700
HML -0.0214 24.6177 0.0000 0.9990 -48.2712 48.2284
SMB -0.1139 9.2329 -0.0100 0.9900 -18.2100 17.9823
Govt -0.0238 0.3640 -0.0700 0.9480 -0.7372 0.6895
         
AR(1)   Sargan test    
Pr > z 0.7820  Prob > chi2 0.9670    
AR(2)   Hansen test    
Pr > z 0.0090   Prob > chi2 0.1810     
Table 11 presents the results of the second step of the Fama Macbeth regressions using the Arellano-
Bond/Blundell GMM estimator approach with coefficients obtained from first pass regressions using the equally 
weighted governance index. A dummy variable for significant government shareholding is added in the second 
pass regressions. L1. = the first lag of the excess return, CGIScore = the governance factor, HML = the value 
factor, GDPGrowth = the GDP factor, SMB = the size factor and Govt = the dummy variable for significant 
government shareholding. While the model passes the first autoregressive (AR(1)) test, the Sargan and Hansen’s 
tests, it fails in the second autoregressive (AR(2)) test. For all the tests, rejection of the null hypothesis leads 
means the model fails the test. 
 
Based on Black et al (2006) who find that higher ratios of net income to assets are 
instrumental variables for corporate governance in firm fixed effects regressions, the asset 
turnover ratio is used to proxy for efficiency. When efficiency is considered, investors 
demand 11.38% as the risk premium for corporate governance risk. This signifies the 






Control on Efficiency             
Prob > chi2  0.0000       
ExcessReturn Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
L1. -1.0461 1.0354 -1.0100 0.3120 -3.0755 0.9833 
CGIScore 0.1138 3.5468 0.0300 0.9740 -6.8379 7.0654 
GDPGrowth 0.7241 2.3936 0.3000 0.7620 -3.9672 5.4154 
Inflation -2.7707 2.6749 -1.0400 0.3000 -8.0135 2.4721 
HML -7.7097 7.5821 -1.0200 0.3090 -22.5703 7.1509 
SMB 1.2380 1.8176 0.6800 0.4960 -2.3245 4.8005 
AT -0.0819 0.2911 -0.2800 0.7790 -0.6524 0.4887 
         
AR(1)   Sargan test    
Pr > z 0.9270  Prob > chi2 0.2250    
AR(2)   Hansen test    
Pr > z 0.2150   Prob > chi2 0.2870     
Table 12 presents the results of the second step of the Fama Macbeth regressions using the Arellano-
Bond/Blundell GMM estimator approach with coefficients obtained from first pass regressions using the equally 
weighted governance index. An additional variable – asset turnover – is added in the firsst pass regressions. L1. 
= the first lag of the excess return, CGIScore = the governance factor, HML = the value factor, GDPGrowth = 
the GDP factor, SMB = the size factor and AT= Asset Turnover. The model passes both autoregressive tests and 


















5. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
This study attempts to determine the risk premium attached by investors to corporate 
governance risk in the Kenyan equity market. Corporate governance risk is noted to be 
important for both investors and managers. Investors who choose an investment strategy that 
is long on companies that have strong standards of corporate governance and short those that 
have weak standards of corporate governance are likely to earn above average returns. 
Managers keen on minimising corporate governance risk minimise agency costs, boost the 
values of their companies and in return their own value in the market for their services. These 
are concepts that have been established in literature. 
 
The contribution of this paper is the determination of the corporate governance risk. Using 10 
companies from the NSE, a corporate governance index is developed and used in Fama 
Macbeth regressions to obtain a governance risk premium of 30.08% which is statistically 
and economically insignificant. However, subsequent iterations of the index with different 
weighting schemes for the different elements of corporate governance yield economically 
significant risk premia that range from 4.64% to 15.16%. Additionally we find that investors 
demand a risk premium of 11.89% when government shareholding is controlled for and 
11.38% when operational governance standards are considered through an efficiency proxy. 
 
The major implication of this study is that investors in Kenya’s equity market attach higher 
risk premia to disclosure and transparency standards of corporate governance. As such, 
companies that have high levels of disclosure are likely to have higher valuations and lower 
costs of capital. Alternatively, investors who sell short companies with poor disclosure and 
transparency and go long on companies with high levels of disclosure and transparency are 
likely to earn a superior return. 
 
This study faces several weaknesses emanating from the short time horizon and cross-section 
of stocks used. A longer time horizon and larger cross-section of stocks will likely yield 
results that are more statistically and empirically sound. The study further encourages 
investigation into the endogeneity problem that arises from the relationship between 
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Appendix A – Corporate Governance Index Variables 
The governance standards and practices used to construct the corporate governance index 
(� ) are as follows; 
 
Variable Value if Present Value if Absent 
1. Shareholder Rights 
Ability to vote in absentia 1 0 
Ability to vote by proxy 1 0 
2. Stakeholder Rights 
Means of reporting illegal/unethical practices to the 
board 
1 0 
3. Disclosure and Transparency 
Disclosure of financial and operating results of the 
company 
1 0 





Disclosure of major share ownership 1 0 
Information on board remuneration and key 
executives 
1 0 
Information on the board members such as but not 
limited to qualifications, other directorships and 
status on independence 
1 0 
Information on related party transactions 1 0 
Disclosure of foreseeable risk factors 1 0 
The governance structure and policies including the 
content of any corporate governance policy 
1 0 
Conduct of annual audits by independent external 
auditors 
1 0 
                                                          
4
Non-financial information refers to information relating to business ethics, the environment and, where material 
to the company, social issues, human rights and other public policy commitments. 
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Online dissemination of financial information and 
reports 
1 0 
4. Board Responsibilities 
Presence of a risk management committee 1 0 
Risk Management Committee headed by independent 
director 
1 0 
Presence of an audit committee and internal audit 
office 
1 0 
Audit committee headed by independent director 1 0 
Presence of a remuneration committee 1 0 
Remuneration committee headed by independent 
director 
1 0 
Annual Board Training 1 0 
Board majority is of independent directors 1 0 
CEO Duality
5
 -1 0 
 
Appendix B – Descriptive Statistics on the Governance Indices 
Equally Weighted Index        
  Sasini KQ TPS Serena Equity ARM Bamburi KPLC KenGen C
Mean -0.09405 -0.02857 0.030952 0.042857 -0.06429 -0.03452 0.132143 0.054762 -
Standard Error 0.021405 0.024181 0.021617 0.016884 0.019026 0.035836 0.008806 0.032159 0.047848
Median -0.0881 -0.03571 0.05 0.05 -0.04524 -0.04524 0.145238 0.059524 0.004762
Mode -0.04286 -0.09048 -0.04286 0.1 -0.04286 -0.1381 0.147619 0.1 0.004762
Standard Deviation 0.060542 0.068394 0.061141 0.047755 0.053815 0.101359 0.024907 0.090958 0.135335
Sample Variance 0.003665 0.004678 0.003738 0.002281 0.002896 0.010274 0.00062 0.008273 0.018316
Kurtosis -0.712 0.88601 -1.76302 -0.94718 -0.74865 -0.48233 -1.59431 0.586005 4.355214
Skewness -0.77361 1.011395 -0.19329 -0.29801 -0.3389 0.645875 -0.69787 -0.15546 -
Range 0.161905 0.2 0.152381 0.133333 0.157143 0.280952 0.061905 0.3 0.461905
          
50% Bias on Stakeholder Rights        
  Sasini KQ TPS Serena Equity ARM Bamburi KPLC KenGen C
Mean -0.08628 -0.04721 0.007214 -0.0019 -0.11284 0.064245 0.138984 0.00513 -
Standard Error 0.010863 0.019279 0.026286 0.007974 0.044716 0.025264 0.021335 0.017479 0.038379
Median -0.07698 -0.07115 0.019896 0.003021 -0.07562 0.051458 0.1675 0.003021 0.019896
Standard Deviation 0.030726 0.054529 0.074348 0.022553 0.126475 0.071456 0.060344 0.049437 0.108551
Sample Variance 0.000944 0.002973 0.005528 0.000509 0.015996 0.005106 0.003641 0.002444 0.011783
                                                          
5
 CEO duality is defined as the occupation of both the chairperson and CEO offices by one individual. 
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Kurtosis -1.66626 1.130748 -0.58625 2.654276 7.1751 1.823691 -1.44511 2.486546 1.263861
Skewness -0.44498 1.281702 0.333994 -1.10903 -2.62489 1.314782 -0.68898 0.57868 -
          
Bias on Disclosure and Transparency       
  Sasini KQ TPS Serena Equity ARM Bamburi KPLC KenGen C
Mean -0.08388 -0.02919 0.021068 0.02237 -0.11357 0.021849 0.120547 0.032526 -
Standard Error 0.02151 0.020401 0.02042 0.013454 0.064681 0.024011 0.008273 0.022042 0.040307
Median -0.08052 -0.04073 0.031979 0.022604 -0.04448 0.012188 0.125313 0.037396 0.030417
Standard Deviation 0.06084 0.057702 0.057756 0.038055 0.182946 0.067913 0.023398 0.062345 0.114006
Sample Variance 0.003701 0.00333 0.003336 0.001448 0.033469 0.004612 0.000547 0.003887 0.012997
Kurtosis -0.84142 2.086187 -0.97736 1.285663 6.953944 1.310422 2.009337 1.116817 3.879731
Skewness -0.35938 1.219338 0.182439 0.577476 -2.57786 1.013545 -1.29973 0.008462 
Range 0.171667 0.18125 0.161875 0.128125 0.571875 0.213125 0.07375 0.212292 0.362708
          
Bias on Board Responsibilities        
  Sasini KQ TPS Serena Equity ARM Bamburi KPLC KenGen C
Mean -0.09161 -0.02911 0.04224 0.05526 -0.14161 -0.03745 0.171406 0.066198 -
Standard Error 0.017855 0.023197 0.031739 0.023428 0.059591 0.041888 0.012828 0.038596 0.053252
Median -0.08604 -0.04708 0.061042 0.054792 -0.07125 -0.04938 0.175625 0.090417 0.032917
Standard Deviation 0.050502 0.065612 0.089772 0.066263 0.16855 0.118478 0.036282 0.109166 0.150619
Sample Variance 0.00255 0.004305 0.008059 0.004391 0.028409 0.014037 0.001316 0.011917 0.022686
Kurtosis -0.69586 0.559523 -2.01946 -0.34863 5.749002 -0.06071 3.123074 0.293636 
Skewness -0.49025 0.985577 -0.27461 0.189933 -2.32334 0.745042 -1.60194 -0.48654 -
Range 0.144167 0.195417 0.211667 0.20625 0.51875 0.34875 0.111667 0.350417 0.499583
 
Appendix C – Equally Weighted Index Regression Statistics 
ARM       
Prob > chi2 0.0000      
R-squared 0.9906      
Return Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
SMB -0.2012 0.0049 -41.1200 0.0000 -0.2108 -0.1916 
CGIScore -0.0930 0.0347 -2.6800 0.0070 -0.1610 -0.0250 
GDPGrowth 0.0074 0.0490 0.1500 0.8800 -0.0887 0.1034 
Inflation -0.0757 0.0086 -8.7600 0.0000 -0.0926 -0.0588 
HML -0.0284 0.0065 -4.3800 0.0000 -0.0411 -0.0157 
_cons 0.0177 0.0012 15.0000 0.0000 0.0154 0.0200 
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Bamburi       
Prob > chi2 0.0000      
R-squared 0.9148      
Return Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
SMB -1.1728 0.4078 -2.8800 0.0040 -1.9720 -0.3735 
CGIScore -0.0496 0.0824 -0.6000 0.5470 -0.2112 0.1120 
GDPGrowth -0.2924 0.2161 -1.3500 0.1760 -0.7159 0.1311 
Inflation -0.1044 0.0525 -1.9900 0.0470 -0.2073 -0.0015 
HML -0.0120 0.0474 -0.2500 0.8000 -0.1050 0.0810 
_cons 0.0376 0.0322 1.1700 0.2430 -0.0256 0.1008 
 
Centum       
Prob > chi2 0.0000      
R-squared 0.9998      
Return Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
SMB -0.0434 0.0004 -104.6200 0.0000 -0.0442 -0.0425 
CGIScore 0.0227 0.0004 62.9900 0.0000 0.0220 0.0234 
GDPGrowth 0.0961 0.0013 72.7400 0.0000 0.0935 0.0987 
Inflation -0.1063 0.0010 -104.6400 0.0000 -0.1083 -0.1043 
HML -0.0127 0.0002 -82.2500 0.0000 -0.0130 -0.0124 
_cons 0.0118 0.0001 86.5700 0.0000 0.0116 0.0121 
 
Equity       
Prob > chi2 0.0000      
R-squared 0.9857      
Return Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
SMB 0.0304 0.0146 2.0800 0.0380 0.0017 0.0591 
CGIScore -0.0183 0.0061 -2.9900 0.0030 -0.0303 -0.0063 
GDPGrowth -0.0889 0.0099 -8.9700 0.0000 -0.1083 -0.0695 
Inflation -0.0449 0.0029 -15.4900 0.0000 -0.0506 -0.0392 
HML -0.0112 0.0011 -10.0200 0.0000 -0.0134 -0.0090 
_cons 0.0154 0.0009 16.7500 0.0000 0.0136 0.0172 
       
Safaricom       
Prob > chi2 0.0000      
R-squared 0.9706      
Return Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
SMB -0.0582 0.0101 -5.7700 0.0000 -0.0780 -0.0384 
CGIScore 0.0453 0.0076 6.0000 0.0000 0.0305 0.0601 
GDPGrowth -0.0913 0.0077 -11.8800 0.0000 -0.1063 -0.0762 
Inflation -0.0157 0.0038 -4.1700 0.0000 -0.0230 -0.0083 
HML -0.0009 0.0003 -2.8700 0.0040 -0.0016 -0.0003 







KenGen       
Prob > chi2 0.0000      
R-squared 0.8454      
Return Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
SMB -0.0209 0.0122 -1.7100 0.0870 -0.0448 0.0031 
CGIScore -0.0061 0.0117 -0.5200 0.6020 -0.0290 0.0168 
GDPGrowth -0.0163 0.0299 -0.5500 0.5840 -0.0749 0.0422 
Inflation -0.0494 0.0127 -3.8700 0.0000 -0.0744 -0.0244 
HML -0.0044 0.0050 -0.8700 0.3850 -0.0142 0.0055 
_cons 0.0076 0.0040 1.9000 0.0570 -0.0002 0.0154 
 
KPLC       
Prob > chi2 0.0000      
R-squared 0.9352      
Return Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
SMB -0.0124 0.0029 -4.3100 0.0000 -0.0181 -0.0068 
CGIScore 0.0574 0.0057 10.1100 0.0000 0.0463 0.0685 
GDPGrowth -0.0050 0.0103 -0.4900 0.6280 -0.0251 0.0151 
Inflation -0.0204 0.0020 -10.1900 0.0000 -0.0244 -0.0165 
HML 0.0086 0.0004 23.7900 0.0000 0.0079 0.0094 
_cons -0.0097 0.0004 -25.8800 0.0000 -0.0104 -0.0090 
       
KQ       
Prob > chi2 0.0000      
R-squared 0.9999      
Return Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
SMB 0.7786 0.0022 354.2600 0.0000 0.7743 0.7829 
CGIScore 0.3660 0.0011 341.7600 0.0000 0.3639 0.3681 
GDPGrowth -0.6219 0.0015 -409.4200 0.0000 -0.6249 -0.6189 
Inflation 0.2457 0.0015 159.0700 0.0000 0.2427 0.2488 
HML -0.0966 0.0001 -723.2000 0.0000 -0.0969 -0.0964 
_cons 0.0727 0.0002 398.2400 0.0000 0.0723 0.0730 
 
TPS Serena       
Prob > chi2 0.0000      
R-squared 0.9339      
Return Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
SMB -0.1727 0.0389 -4.4300 0.0000 -0.2490 -0.0964 
CGIScore -0.0229 0.0190 -1.2100 0.2260 -0.0601 0.0142 
GDPGrowth 0.2117 0.1061 1.9900 0.0460 0.0037 0.4198 
Inflation -0.0062 0.0096 -0.6400 0.5200 -0.0251 0.0127 
HML 0.0202 0.0114 1.7700 0.0770 -0.0022 0.0426 







Sasini       
Prob > chi2 0.0000      
R-squared 0.9991      
Return Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
SMB -0.0145 0.0009 -15.6100 0.0000 -0.0163 -0.0127 
CGIScore 0.0021 0.0002 8.5000 0.0000 0.0016 0.0025 
GDPGrowth 0.0712 0.0016 43.5200 0.0000 0.0680 0.0744 
Inflation -0.0099 0.0002 -40.1400 0.0000 -0.0103 -0.0094 
HML 0.0053 0.0002 28.2100 0.0000 0.0049 0.0056 
_cons -0.0045 0.0002 -25.8100 0.0000 -0.0049 -0.0042 
 
